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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JEFFRY R. GITTINS,
Appellant
Appellate Case No. 20070289-CA
vs.
SMITHFIELD CITY,
Appellee

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
I. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE JUDGMENT
The Appellant ("Gittins") posits that the declaratory judgment signed
March 27, 2007 ("the Declaratory Judgment") is final within the meaning of Rule
3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, notwithstanding ProMax Development
Corp. v. Raile, 998 P.2d 254 (Utah 2000). Appellee ("the City") responded with
three new citations, all referring back to the ProMax decision. Rather than
supporting the City's view that the Declaratory Judgment was incomplete due to a
preliminary attorney's fee award, these three cases illustrate why the Declaratory
Judgment is not robbed of finality by virtue of the trial court's unaccepted sua
sponte invitation to the City to file an attorney's fee affidavit.

1

The Utah Supreme Court in Sittner v. Schriever, 2000 UT 45, 2 P.3d 442,
reversed the dismissal of an appeal from "the entire judgment, including the
Summary Judgment entered March 25, 1997." Id. at Tf 11. The notice of appeal
was filed some eight months after the March 25th judgment,1 but within 30 days of
entry of "a new supplemental judgment awarding attorneys fees" which "fixed the
amount of attorney fees to be awarded." Id.
The core of the Sittner opinion was the following holding
We . . . hold that under ProMax, Sittner's appeal is not precluded by his
failure to file a notice of appeal within thirty days of the March 25
judgment because that judgment - which failed to fix the amount of
attorney fees to be awarded - was not final for purposes of appeal.
Id. at H 19. Important, therefore, in the Sittner decision, was the unfinished nature
of the March 25th judgment. In its earlier description of that judgment, the
Supreme Court emphasized that the incomplete state of the attorney's fee award
was obvious from the face of the judgment.
On March 25, 1997, the trial court granted summary judgment. . .
[T]he court dismissed Sittner's complaint and ordered Sittner to pay
defendants' costs and reasonable attorney fees. The court expressly
reserved the amount of attorney fees for later determination.
Id, at f 4.

1

The City incorrectly implies that Sittner's notice of appeal was filed timely after
a June 27th judgment fixing the amount of attorney's fees. Although the trial court
extended the deadline to file an appeal, Sittner did not file within the extension,
but instead moved for relief under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
waited until after disposition of that motion to file the notice of appeal. Sittner, at
1118,10-11.
2

by the Declaratory Judgment in this case. When Gittins filed the notice of appeal,
there was nothing in the Declaratory Judgment indicative of an unsettled question.
In Beddoes v lr„MMM
, f "IHhllli \^ I % H I" Villlfl

llllllr IH ill Siiptniip < mini

affirmed this Court's dismissal of an appeal as untimely. The trial court entered
an order dismissing the complaint on September 22, 2005? apparently with no
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moved for an award of costs. Id. The court's order denying the motion followed
in November. I? Beddoes filed a notice of appeal in December, Id.
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the question was whether the matter yet to be resolved could influence the main
decision.
Only material matters that affect the substance and character of a judgment
must be resolved before a judgment is final. Court costs and other matters
clerical in nature are not material and do not need to be resolved for a
judgment to be final for the purposes of an appeal
Id. at ^J 12. The Court emphasized that materiality was a principle and distinction
tl nrnimi/ed HI PvohU i\
We refused [in ProMax] to dismiss the plaintiffs appeal as
untimely. Finding that both amendments were "amendments in a "material
matter,'" we recognized that they were materially different from the
amendment made in Neilson v. Gurley [888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App.
1994)], where the modification or amendment was to recite that the
prevailing party was entitled to coi irt costs ".
Beddoes at If 9.

3

In the case at bar, the trial court's impromptu decision that the City could
be awarded its fees is not connected to the Declaratory Judgment in any way. The
City's motion (to dismiss) was overruled concurrently with the court's
pronouncement that attorney's fees were appropriate in conjunction with that
motion. Doubtless, the City would have still been entitled to garner this early fee
award even if the trial court had granted Gittins' motion for summary judgment.
As in Beddoesy the trial court's offer of a fee award regarding the motion to
dismiss is not a "material matter that affects the character and substance o f the
Declaratory Judgment, and therefore does "not need to be resolved for [the
Declaratory Judgment] to be final for the purposes of an appeal." See Id. at \ 12.
This Court's unpublished memorandum decision in Turville v. J &J
Properties, L.C, 2004 UT App 389U, 2004 WL 2404688, dealt with an appellee's
request for sanctions under Rules 33 and 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. The appeal was being summarily dismissed because the order from
which the appeal was taken "did not resolve the issue of attorney's fees." Id. at
para. 3.2
There is insufficient information to compare the Declaratory Judgment with
the judgment addressed in the Turville memorandum decision. However, this
Court's award of some attorney's fees for the motion for summary disposition
serves as a reminder that the bases for fee awards may vary, along with their
association to the case and ultimate judgment. Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil
The appellant in that case conceded that the appeal was premature. Id. at para. 2.
4

Procedure provides for fee awards as sanctions for failure to make or cooperate in
discovery. These awards are resolvable without reference to who ultimately
prevails in the action. Fee awards under Rule 16, like the one offered to the City3,
are similarly self-contained. Ordinarily, awards made at this stage of the
proceeding are concluded and dealt with before or in the main judgment.4
Principal judgments are also unaffected by fee awards under Rule 11.
"Indeed, by their very nature, rule 11 sanctions are a collateral issue and do not
address the merits of the party's cause of action." Barton v. Utah Transit
Authority, 872 P.2d 1036, 1040 (Utah 1994). These kinds of awards stand in
contrast with fee awards to a prevailing party pursuant to a contract or under a
statute. The question whether and how much to award in fees in these cases, is
axiomatically tied up in the merits of a judgment.
The three cases cited by the City as support for its rigid interpretation of
ProMax, demonstrate instead that care must be taken to square the circumstances
of the case at hand with the principles undergirding Pro Max and its progeny.
Some facets of this case, regarding finality, are anomalous. Yet it will still be
helpful for this Court to confirm and discuss the factors present here that show the
Declaratory Judgment to be final, consistent with the ProMax line of cases.
3

In providing for the fee award, Judge Low did not cite a rule. Rule 16(d) is the
one that best fits the situation.
4

It is arguable that unresolved preliminary awards are merged into a judgment that
is silent as to their disposition, or that the beneficiary of an award implicitly
waives the award, especially if their counsel prepares the judgment. Those
arguments are not directly before the Court at this time.
5

II. THE CITY'S FEBRUARY 8 1H LAND USE DECISION WAS ILLEGAL
Gittins demonstrated that the City's decision of February 8, 2006 was
illegal. See Brief of Appellant, Point II, Pp. 8-10, 14-28. The City responded with
a wide-ranging variety of un-subdivided arguments. See Brief of Appellee, Point
II, Pp. 8, 12-16. The thread the City would have this Court follow begins on
January 26th, when the City Manager testified that he began grappling with two
interwoven conundra: How does one draft (for the ordinance) an adequate legal
description of a rezone boundary where the Council was (according to the City
Manager) vague or ambiguous in its decision of the previous night?; and, How
does one remedy the absence, when the vote was taken on January 25th, of a
written draft ordinance conforming to the amended rezone? The City claims the
best its Manager could do was to prepare four drafts, alternative to the original,
and present all five to the Council at its next meeting. In this construction, the
City cuts through the Gordian knot(s) by simply deciding on the rezone boundary
for the (legitimate) first time on February 8th. The City baldly asserts that "no
ordinance was adopted in the January 25, 2006 meeting." Brief of Appellee, Pp.
13-14. Under this theory, there was no prior action impeding the (later) decision.
The threshold problem with the City's argument is that it seeks to ignore
what occurred on January 25th, when the City Council deliberated, exercised its
legislative discretion, and made a land use decision, and did so after all of the
preliminary notices and public hearings which Utah statutes and Smithfield City
ordinances require.
6

A. On January 25 the City Council Made a Land Use Decision
Notwithstanding the City Manager's "discovery"5 of the statutory advance
draft mandate, the Council made its decision on the rezone application on January
25th. The City's interpretation of Patterson v. Alpine City, 663 P.2d 95 (Utah
1983) goes farther than the holding. Patterson paid a sewer connection fee of
$1,500, under protest, in December of 1979. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that §
10-3-506, Utah Code "requiring that all resolutions shall be in writing is
mandatory." Id. at 96. The decision's focus was not on the question of when the
writing was in play because, as the Alpine City admitted, the sewer-fee resolution
was never put in writing. On October 26, 2007, the Utah Supreme Court decided
Bisslandv. Bankhead, 2007 UT 86, 171 P.3d 430. In that case, Providence City
voted on an annexation ordinance on October 24, 2006. The ordinance included
language that "[t]he city council recognized . . . was flawed. " Id. at Tf 2.
At the meeting, the city attorney proposed the change in language necessary
to cure the contradiction. The city council passed the ordinance despite the
flaw, with the understanding that the city attorney would remedy the defect

Id. The petitioners argued that their time to submit a referendum on the ordinance
did not commence on October 24th. This argument was rejected:

5

One possible reason why the City's Manager, with 23 years of experience, would
be surprised by this requirement is alluded to in an exchange between the City's
staff and Gittins in the days preceding the January 25th meeting. Gittins expressed
concern that amendments should be in writing before a vote is taken. Their
response was that the requirement had been removed by "the new LUDMA laws."
F. 50.
7

Because the annexation ordinance completed the deliberative
process required of the Providence City Council on October 24, this was
the date of the ordinance's passage. Petitioners have not indicated nor have
we discovered any evidence that the city council somehow failed to comply
with or circumvented any of these requirements. Thus, we hold that
passage occurred when three of the five members of the city council voted
for the annexation ordinance and not when the law was posted or signed on
November 15.
Id at \ 11. A legislative decision is made and an ordinance is passed when the
council says "aye." Draft revisions, signing, and posting may come later, possibly
delaying the effectiveness of the ordinance. See §§ 10-3-705, 711, Utah Code.
Smithfield City's deliberative process on the rezone application was
completed on January 25th, concluding with a vote. That rezone was passed. As
was the case with Providence City, the draft before the Smithfield City Council
was not conformed to the motion. But that mismatch did not erase the decision as
a concluding exercise of legislative discretion.
B. New Notice and Public Hearings Were Required After January 25th
Assuming instead that, as the City claims, the January 25th decision was a
nullity, then on January 26 the property was still zoned exactly as it was before
the application for rezone was ever filed. The City could not skip forward to a
rezone and skip past the notices and public hearings that are essential not only to
sound decision-making, but to the safeguarding of property rights, and as such
required by law. Utah case law leaves no doubt that notice and opportunity to be
heard, in the zoning context, are essential. See Citizen's Awareness Now v.
Marakis, 873 P.2d 1117, 1123 (Utah 1994) ("Voters are statutorily granted the
8

right to be notified of changes and developments in their community's zoning
laws."); Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986) ("Notice, to
be effective, must alert the public to the nature and scope of the ordinance that is
finally adopted.... Failure to follow the statutory requirements in enacting the
ordinance renders it invalid.").
The City's view is that due process niceties can be satisfied in this case by
th

th

piggy-backing the February 8 decision on to the January 25 pre-vote
procedures. Pursuing this angle, the City urges that: (1) the situation from one
meeting to the next was unchanged; (2) the concerns raised in the public hearings
were also addressed on February 8th; (3) the public was properly notified of the
th

February 8 meeting; and (4) the agenda items, and property in question were
identical (along with the subtle suggestion that even though there was no public
(\

th

hearing on February 8 , public input would have been allowed ). The first two
assertions are incorrect: (1) The situation had changed between meetings. For
example, Council Member Wood came to a new understanding of agreements
between the landowners and a developer, F. 99, and Council Member Monson
th

had received numerous calls. See February 8 minutes, p. 11, Addendum C to
th

Brief of Appellee. (2) There were concerns raised in the January 25 hearing that
th

were not addressed at the February 8 meeting. Compare comments of Carlene
Umpley, Jeff Barnes, and Scott Poulsen at Pp. 4-5 of January 25th minutes,
6

"The public was allowed to comment on the [February 8th] agenda item." Brief
of Appellee, p. 9. To put it gently, this statement is without support in the record.
9

Addendum B to Brief of Appellee, with February 8 minutes, Pp. 10-12. More to
the point, all of the City's assertions about the "sameness" between January 25th
and February 8th are irrelevant. The City's position that it can cobble together due
process for the February 8th hearing from the planning commission hearing, the
15-day notice, and the public hearing held January 25th is at once selfcontradicting (the City maintains the January 25th process was a shambles) and
contrary to fundamental principles of law which appellate courts in Utah have yet
to apply in the narrow context of the City's due process carryover argument.
In Anderson v. Judd, 158 Colo. 46, 404 P.2d 553 (1965) (en banc) the
municipality (Denver) held a public hearing on a zoning change, and decided
against it on August 5, 1968. At its regular meeting held two weeks later, the
council reconsidered, reversed itself and adopted the rezone ordinance. Id. at 554.
The rezone ordinance was challenged for not having been preceded by fresh notice
and public hearing as required by Denver's charter and zoning ordinances. After
extensive analysis, the Supreme Court of Colorado ruled against the rezone.

This rezone ordinance was passed through a two step process of approving a
motion to reconsider, followed by approval of the ordinance upon reconsideration.
This, despite the fact that a motion to reconsider was rejected at the earlier
meeting/hearing after the ordinance was initially disapproved. The Supreme Court
of Colorado determined that the city had power to reconsider in these
circumstances:
The law is clear that a municipal legislative body may reconsider its
actions and rescind an ordinance that has been previously enacted, or enact
an ordinance that has previously been defeated, at any time before the rights
of third parties have become vested, where there is no statutory, charter, or
other prohibition, as in this case.
10

Sufficient or proper notice required by charter or ordinance, cannot
be regarded as unsubstantial or innocuous. Right of notice to, and
opportunity for, hearing by affected property owners is entirely too
fundamental to require discussion. The intent of the charter and ordinance
is crystal clear and a lack of compliance therewith dictates reversal of this
case.
Id. at 558. The Supreme Court of Colorado did not find itself alone among
jurisdictions ruling that a second decision cannot borrow due process from the
public hearings and notice leading up to the earlier round. That Court looked to
Massachusetts and happened on a case where, apparently, the City of Springfield
tried to persuade the court there that its rules were not so inflexible as to prevent a
reconsideration; but that argument was bypassed due to the due process issue.
" . . . when the May 11 meeting dissolved, the proposed ordinance
was no longer pending before the common council because it had been
defeated. Under usual parliamentary procedure, it would have been too late
to move for reconsideration after the May 11 meeting had adjourned.
" . . . We need not consider whether valid rules could embody a
custom thus permitting recurrent presentations of a zoning change after
unfavorable action. [ . . . ] . . .
" . . . In respect of zoning changes, it is obviously desirable that
members of the public shall be able to ascertain the legislative status of a
proposed change at all times, and to rely on unfavorable action, final in
accordance with applicable rules, as a complete defeat of the proposal"
(Emphasis supplied.)
Id. at 557, (quoting Kitty v. City of Springfield, 343 Mass. 321, 178 N.E.2d 580
(1961)). New York courts reached the same conclusion.

7(Confd.)A/ a t 5 5 7 A s a r g u e d i n t h e Brief of Appellant, Point 11(B), Pp. 17-21, a
prohibition against subsequent reconsideration exists in Smithfield City's case.
That reconsideration was allowed under Denver's ordinances makes it easier to
separate the Anderson analyses of due process and "reconsideration" issues.
11

. . . "The meeting of July 15 , called after notice of public hearing, was
closed after a defeat of the resolution and was not adjourned to a further
date or to the call of the chair. Therefore the town board had spent its
authority in that connection and under the notice of public hearing, and in
no event could reconsider or take any further action without a new notice of
public hearing being had."
Id. at 557 (quoting Rabasco v. Town ofGreenburgh, 285 App. Div. 895, 137
N.Y.S.2d 802, affd. 309 N.Y. 735, 128 N.E.2d 425) (1955)).
The City's efforts to stretch its February 8 decision around the
fundamental requirements of due process, and its own ordinance mandating fifteen
days advance notice of a public hearing, yield odd argumentative side-effects, not
the least of which is the City becoming the challenger of its own actions. Taking
his cue from the City's previous stances, Gittins has already batted down several
attempts by the City to rationalize the February 8 action. See Brief of Appellant,
Point II, Pp. 14-28. The City's Brief throws some new curveballs, however, that
should be dealt with.

C. The February 8 Land Use Decision Was a Reconsideration
The City takes the stand, for the first time,9 that the adoption of the zoning
ordinance on February 8, 2006 was not a "reconsideration." Brief of Appellee, Pp.

It is not a surprise that minimum notice for Smithfield City and Denver City was
fifteen days. Only fourteen days passed from the regular meeting of January 25th
to the regular meeting of February 8th, making it impossible for the City to comply
with its own rezone ordinance, even if notice had been sent on January 26th.
9

The City argued/acknowledged below that there was no motion to reconsider in
the January 25th meeting, but did not claim the action of February 8th was not a
reconsideration. See Brief of Appellee, Addendum E ("Tr."), p. 49, LI. 22-25.
12

8, 13. This position is directly contrary to the record before the trial court and this
Court.
The City Manager wrote to Gittins less than a month after and said,
referring to the February 8th decision, "As a result, the matter was brought back to
the city council for reconsideration." R. 186, Addendum to Brief of Appellant, p.
2. This was no slip of the keyboard. A few sentences later the manager provided
(incorrect) justification for the reconsideration. "It is not uncommon or unlawful
for a city council to reconsider a previous decision either in the meeting when the
initial decision is made or in a subsequent meeting . . . " Id. Reconsideration was
more than just a label the City Manager placed on the action of February 8th; it was
the substance of what occurred there. The January 25 and February 8 decisions
together, with the latter unmistakably and explicitly constituting a re-do of the
former. There are numerous allusions to the substance of this connection. See,
e.g., the City's "Chronology", F. 71 10 . The contemporaneous minutes of the
February 8th meeting make clear that the City Council was aware that they were
redoing the earlier decision. "Council Member Watkins asked if the previous
motion was gone. Yes." F. 97. The City saw fit to insert explanatory italicized
notes into the minutes of both meetings, expressly cross-referencing the two. F.

"F." as used herein refers to a numbered statement from facts submitted to the
trial court in Gittins' summary judgment memorandum, which is reproduced as
Addendum 1 to the Brief of Appellant. None of the facts in that statement were
put in contest by the City.
13

67, 70, 95. n The City's denial that the land use decision of February 8th was a
reconsideration is without any evidentiary support in the extensive record. If the
City had produced contradictory evidence, a genuine issue would have been
raised, which might have precluded summary judgment. By whatever label, the
City, on February 8 reconsidered (considered again) the January 25 decision.
D, The February 8th Land Use Decision Was Not a Continuance
The City advances the novel argument that the Council's action on
February 8th "was a legitimate and authorized continuation of the legislative
process of the governing body to adopt, in the first instance, an ordinance." Brief
of Appellee, p. 13; see also p. 8. Again, there is no evidentiary (or other) support
for this idea in the record.
It was undisputed below that the January 25th meeting adjourned at 10:40
p.m. that night, F. 69, that there was no continuance, or tabling, or assignment, or
reservation of any kind that occurred regarding the rezone at that meeting, See
Addendum B to the Brief of Appellant, and that when the meeting closed there
were no lingering questions, uncertainties, or assignments expressed about the
boundary or anything else having to do with the rezone. F. 63-64. It is instructive
that the Council knew how to continue a matter to a later time. At 9:22 on January
25th the Council held a public hearing on the "Annexation of Stafford Property,"
and deferred the matter to the next meeting: "No vote was taken. This will be
11

Addenda B and C to the Brief of Appellee contain the full text of the minutes of
the two meetings. The parenthetical notes appear on pages 8 and 10, respectively.
14

considered at the February 8, 2006 meeting." Addendum B to Brief of Appellee,
p. 8. There having been no continuance of the rezone during the January 25th
public meeting, the City's claim of "a legitimate and authorized continuation of
the legislative process of the governing body" begs the questions, Authorized by
who? and Authorized when? Only the legislative body can authorize the
continuation of the legislative process, especially where the City's official minutes
reflect termination of tate process. If the continuation were "authorized" by the
Council, such authorization must occur after the public meeting, and in violation
of Utah's Open Meetings Act, §§10-3-601, 52-4-101, et seq., Utah Code, in which
event the continuation would not have been "legitimate."

E. § 10-3-508, Utah Code, Does Not Authorize Reconsideration
The City maintains that § 10-3-508, Utah Code, should be read to implicitly
authorize Utah municipalities to reconsider ordinances in certain circumstances.
The statute instead prohibits reconsideration in limited, specific circumstances.
Any action taken by the governing body shall not be reconsidered or
rescinded at any special meeting unless the number of members of the
governing body present at the special meeting is equal to or greater than the
number of members present at the meeting when the action was approved.
Id. Under the City's sweeping interpretation, any reconsideration not prohibited
by this section is authorized.
A straightforward reading of the statute negates the City's argument. The
statute does not state that it is the exclusive circumstance under which
reconsideration may be prohibited. It does not say that reconsiderations are ever
15

allowed in regular meetings - it would be at least as easy and just as incorrect to
infer from the statute that reconsiderations are never allowed elsewhere than at a
special meeting as it is to accept that any reconsideration at a special meeting are
universally allowed. It is untenable to assume from this language that any
reconsideration at a regular meeting is prohibited if fewer council members are
present than attended the first meeting; yet this interpretation does not strain the
statute's meaning nearly so far as does the City's backlighting of the statute's
restrictive silhouette. The maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius does not
have the potential to invest § 10-3-508 with the City's hoped-for meaning, because
the iteration of one statutory prohibition against reconsideration does not imply
legislative intent to either exclude all other prohibitions or to authorize all
reconsiderations not covered by the statutory restriction. See, e.g., Duke v.
Graham, 2007 UT 31, Tflj 15-17, 158 P.3d 540, 544-45. Whatever else § 10-3-508
means, it cannot be understood license to the City to abrogate its own ordinances.
F. The February 8th Action Was the City's Attempt to Solve a Non-Problem
During proceedings for summary judgment, the City argued that boundary
uncertainties and the lack of a written draft on January 25th necessitated and
justified the City's February 8th revisiting of the rezone. Anticipating a renewal of
both these arguments,12 Gittins dealt with them in Points 11(C) and (D),

12

The City's reconsideration was addressed by Gittins in Points 11(A) and (B), Pp.
15-21 in the Brief of Appellant. The City's only new note on this point regarding "latitude," - p. 16 of the Brief of Appelleee, simply has no basis.
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respectively, Pp. 21-28, Brief of Appellant. In furtherance of its pretension that
the February 8 decision was a first-time action cleared of any January 25
encumbrances, the City has thrown overboard the excuses it offered for the
February 8 decision.

"The action taken at the February 8, 2006 meeting was

not a boundary clarification subject to review by the Board of Adjustment/Appeal
Authority, nor was it a 'formality cure.'" Brief of Appellee, p. 16.
Gittins' arguments discredited the City's claim that there was a necessity
for the February 8th action, and explained why, even were action needed, the
course followed by the City was illegal. Until the Brief of Appellee, the City
alleged its February 8 action was to clarify the rezone boundary and to correct the
written-draft omission by means of a remedial reconsideration. If successful, the
City's latest re-characterization of the bases for its February 8 procedure would
tend to push this Court toward the comer the City continues to urge, namely:
There was no way other than a reconsideration (version 1) or continuance (version
2) for the City to solve the intractable twin problems of boundary uncertainty and
lack of written ordinance drafts.
Rather than coping with Gittins' reasoning why there were no real
problems, and addressing the alternative legal ways Gittins showed the perceived
difficulties could have been avoided or solved, the City offers up the solitary fact
that "the meeting [on January 25th] was held at the City's Senior Citizen's Center,

13

The City also nixed its "reconsideration" argument, but elsewhere in Appellee's
Brief. See Point 11(A) above.
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where access to a computer and similar items was not available." Brief of
Appellee, p. 14. The City had pens, and a previously-marked map showing where
the boundary of the downsized rezone. F. 63. The City has not explained why it
didn't substitute the map for the ordinance, or why the map has not been produced.
Detailed legal descriptions were not needed; the January 25th motion was
sufficiently clear. The City's premise that the precision of a legal description was
essential is debunked by its own ordinances empowering the Board of
Adjustments/Appeal Authority to clarify uncertain boundaries and providing it
rules of boundary construction to guide it in that process. See F. 11, 14-15, 17,
Zoning Ordinances of Smithfield §§ 17.04.050, 17.20.030-040, 17.44.040.
Following the City's most recent statements about what the February 8th
decision was not, the destination is a dead end. According to the City, the
February 8th action: was not a "reconsideration;" was not a "boundary
clarification;" and was not a "formality cure." This leaves as the only remaining
possibility an invisible "continuance" which is demonstrated above to be
nonexistent and not viable.

G. The City Did Not Wait Indefinitely to Adopt a Rezone
The City claims the authority to wait indefinitely to resolve a pending
zoning application.
Once proper notice has been given and necessary public hearings have been
held by both the Planning Commission and the City Council, neither State
nor City law requires that an ordinance adopting the proposed rezone be
adopted within any set period of time after the last public hearing.
18

Brief of Appellee, p. 15. This assertion points to another reason why the February
8th action was illegal. From the City's earlier perspective, the City has power to
reconsider a rezone either during the same meeting where the motion was
originally made "or in a subsequent meeting." See p. 2, Addendum 2 to Brief of
Appellant. The City denies that the passage of time in between the last public
hearing and the reconsideration meeting makes any difference, no matter how
"subsequent" that meeting turns out to be. From the City's most recent
perspective, an undetectable continuance motion has the potential to delay a vote
on a rezone application for an indefinitely lengthy time. Indefinite "continuances"
and indefinite "reconsiderations," are alike in their potential for mischief, delay,
and uncertainty. The City is essentially saying it holds a procedural blank check,
cashable on one day's notice. Aside from notions of fair play and due process, the
citizens had a right to expect the City to adhere to its own published rules setting
limits. Judge Low's query, Tr. p. 46, LI. 6-12, is apropos in the time context:
Why do you think the city can adopt the Robert's Rules of Order and
then disregard them, where at least constructively citizens of that city, and
in fact anybody else, would be operating on reliance on those rules? They
can rely on the city council to follow its own rules. When it doesn't why
can't they be relieved of any action by the city if they appeal within the
appropriate time?
An indefinite delay did not happen in this case. The Council voted on the
same day as it held the public hearing, January 25, 2006. As that meeting ended,
there was no continuance or deferral. It was unimaginable that the Council would
later pass a different rezone without following the rezone process.
19

III. PREJUDICE, BY ANY DEFINITION, WAS SHOWN
In Point III of the Brief of Appellant, Pp. 28-32, Gittins discussed the
"prejudice" requirement articulated in Springville Citizens for a Better Community
v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, \ 31, 979 P.2d 332, 338. Gittins showed that
there was evidence, four layers thick, that if the illegalities were removed, there
would have been a different outcome. Brief of Appellant, Pp. 28-32. This focus
was consistent with this Court's interpretation of the prejudice issue:
Following Springville Citizens, we require Gardner to establish on
remand that the City Council's decision would have been different if it had
followed its ordinance.
Gardner v. Perry City, 2000 UT App 1, ^ 20, 994 P.2d 811, 815-16. The City
ignores the question whether the City's decision would have been different if the
procedure followed were legal. Instead, the City generally avers that the trial
court found no prejudice because none was shown. See Point III, Brief of
Appellee, Pp. 16-17.14 The City calls for "demonstrated evidence of actual
prejudice to the Appellant" and sees none, asserting that Gittins was given notice
of the February 8th meeting, where the City claims the "public was allowed to
comment on the agenda item." Brief of Appellee, Pp. 8-9. The parties' arguments
pass by each other, apparently due to divergent understandings of "prejudice." At
14

The City's Statement of Facts ^f 13 has a similarly sweeping assertion, citing 25
pages of argument from the hearing transcript. Brief of Appellee, p. 6. This
statement, like many of the others and the first three-fourths of the City's
Statement of the Case, belongs in the Argument. At the hearing, Gittins' counsel
responded to the Court's repeated insistence that there was no prejudice by
pointing to the evidences of prejudice discussed in the Brief of Appellee. See
Addendum E to the Brief of Appellant, Pp. 25-30, 55-64, 72-87. ("Tr.")
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the hearing on summary judgment motions, the trial court explained its
understanding of prejudice.
MR. DAINES: Do we want to go to the prejudice or shouldn't we
deal with the illegality first?
THE COURT: Well, if it's not illegal, there's no prejudice. If
there's no prejudice, you have no standing. So take either one. They
dovetail together.
Tr. p. 24, LI. 21-25. This straightforward view is consistent with the trial court's
abbreviated ruling: "The Plaintiff was not prejudiced by the City's action."
It is understandable that a trial court would resist addressing the prejudice
issue before finding illegality in a municipality's procedure. If the city's actions
are legal, it makes no sense to move on to the prejudice question. Bifurcation of
the illegality and prejudice issues would enable the trial court, parties, and
witnesses to see the prejudice issue through an established hypothetical window.1
As presaged in the courtroom exchange, Judge Low's ultimate determination of
legality led him to conclude there could be no prejudice. From the trial court's
perspective, once illegality was ruled out, any attempt to examine evidence of
prejudice would have been a useless expenditure of judicial resources.
In addition to chaining the prejudice issue to the illegality issue, the trial
court equated prejudice with standing. The City follows the same path when it
argues about whether Gittins attended hearings or was given notice. The City's
15

The procedural stance of the two reported cases on prejudice illustrates that
bifurcation suits these issues. In both cases the trial court ruled the action was
legal, the trial court was reversed, and the case was remanded so the trial court
could move on to deal with the prejudice issue.
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phrase "actual prejudice to the Appellant" reflects the trial court's insistence on a
showing of near-tangible harm to Gittins. The trial court confused the prejudice
requirement with the standing requirement in §10-9a-801(2)(a), Utah Code, that a
challenger be "any person adversely affected" by a municipal land use decision.
THE COURT: What exactly is the prejudice suffered by your
client?

MR. DAINES: The prejudice is that it wouldn't have been rezoned.
To get back to THE COURT: I'm not clarifying myself very well here. Let's
assume that the 25 acres is rezoned. Even had he been to all the meetings MR. DAINES: When?
THE COURT: Had he been to the 18th meeting and the 25th and on
the 25 the rezone occurred. All 25 some acres had been rezoned then.
Mr. Gass could have drafted this thing and it was all done and signed the
next week by the mayor and recorded. Let's assume that happened. What
is the prejudice to your client?
th

MR. DAINES: None. But that's not what happened.
THE COURT: I'm not talking about any theoretical or even actual
compliance with the code. I want to know how the rezone adversely affects
your client.
MR. DAINES: He has a dairy nearby.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. DAINES: And it's throughout the record what the prejudice is
to him.
THE COURT: Tell me what it is. Tell me how he is adversely
affected if in fact this property is zoned into residential. I know he doesn't
want it, but is there some actual prejudice occurring here, and if so what is
it?
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MR. DAINES: I thought we were beyond the question of adverse
affect.
THE COURT: I'm asking the question. What actually happens to
him if this rezone is in fact - let's assume this. Let's assume - 1 asked you
the question before and you avoided it. If I decide this case in favor of the
city, how is he adversely affected? I don't want to know anything about the
city didn't comply, what actually happened to him? Does he lose money,
does his farm shut down? What happens?
MR. DAINES: The answer is in the facts.
THE COURT: Just tell me.
MR. DAINES: I honestly didn't come prepared to argue about his
standing. That was conceded by the city.
THE COURT: I'm not interested in standing. I'm interested in
what it is he doesn't like about this thing. I want to know how he's
personally prejudiced by this action. He doesn't want to have houses next
to his? Does it take his view away?
Tr. p. 73,1. 12 through p. 75,1. 11. Counsel's exposition of facts from the record
in exchanges with Judge Low consumed 30 pages of transcript. Evidences of
prejudice as defined in Sprinville Citizens (the outcome would have been different
through a legal process) and of adverse effect to Gittins as demanded by the trial
court (economic harm) were provided and argued. The City never contested
Gittins' standing and never disputed the facts supporting Gittins' one-line claim on
standing: "Petitioner was adversely affected. F. 44-45, 50, 73, 96, 109-10, 117,
137, 160, 162, 165."16 The City never offered evidence to show that Gittins would

1(,

R. 452. The City invokes § 10-9a-801(8)(a), Utah Code, to exclude evidence of
prejudice outside the City's record. The City did not so object below, and in any
event, 161 of 165 established facts were from the City's record.
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not experience loss or hardship from the re-rezone. The only testimony the City
supplied the Court grazing the Springville Citizens standard, was a chorus of
council members vaguely announcing the non-effect of Roberts Rules of Order.17
The only way to reconcile this state of the record with the trial court's
declaratory judgment, is to accept Judge Low's explanation.

If there is no

illegality, there is no prejudice, and if there is no prejudice, there is no standing.
But Gittins was adversely affected. The City's actions were illegal. And Gittins,
by any measure, suffered prejudice as a result.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, and for the reasons expressed in his earlier brief, the
Appellant, Jeffry R. Gittins, respectfully asks this Court to reverse the judgment of
the district court and remand with instructions to enter a declaratory judgment that
the City Council's decision and rezone ordinance of February 8th is illegal and
void, and to proceed further as described in the conclusion of the Brief of
Appellant.
See Brief of Appellant, Pp. 31-32. None of the City's 9 affidavits were in the
record it supplied to the Court. However, Gittins did not object on that basis.
18

Though the trial court's reasoning involved an erroneous misinterpretation of
Springville Citizens, it is easy to appreciate the misapprehension. § 10-9a801(3)(a)(ii), Utah Code, mandates exclusive judicial focus on "whether or not the
decision, ordinance, or regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." Judge Low
was mindful of this. Tr., p. 3, LI. 5-7. "Prejudice," would be outside the court's
scope of inquiry, unless it were another way of saying "adversely affected," the
standing qualification expressed earlier in the same statute. (These observations
are not to argue that the Springville Citizens prejudice requirement should be
scrapped or disregarded.)
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